Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players by Briest, Patrick et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
4.
45
24
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
9 A
pr
 20
08
Approximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players∗
Patrick Briest
Dept. of Computer Science
University of Liverpool, U.K.
Patrick.Briest@liverpool.ac.uk
Paul W. Goldberg
Dept. of Computer Science
University of Liverpool, U.K.
P.W.Goldberg@liverpool.ac.uk
Heiko Ro¨glin
Dept. of Computer Science
RWTH Aachen, Germany
roeglin@cs.rwth-aachen.de
November 11, 2018
Abstract
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (ǫ-Nash equi-
libria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant.
We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It
is known from recent work that in the 2-player case, a 1
2
-Nash equilibrium can be
easily found, but in general one cannot achieve a smaller value of ǫ than 1
2
. In
this paper we extend those results to the k-player case, and find that ǫ = 1 − 1
k
is feasible, but cannot be improved upon. We show how stronger results for the
2-player case may be used in order to slightly improve upon the ǫ = 1− 1
k
obtained
in the k-player case.
1 Introduction
A game in normal form has k players, and for each player p a set Sp of pure strategies.
In this paper we assume that all sets Sp are of the same size n. The set S of pure
strategy profiles is the cartesian product of the sets Sp. For each player p and each
s ∈ S, the game has an associated value ups, being the utility or payoff to player p if
all players choose s. Note that the number of quantities needed to specify the game
is k · nk, so we must take k to be a constant, for the game’s description to be of size
polynomial in n.
A mixed strategy for player p is a probability distribution over Sp. Suppose that
each player p chooses distribution Dp over Sp. Let us define a player’s regret to be the
highest payoff he could obtain by choosing a best response to the other players’ mixed
strategies, minus his actual expected payoff. Then, a Nash equilibrium is a set of Dp’s
for which all players’ regrets are zero. We say that the distributions Dp form an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium provided that all players’ regrets are at most ǫ.
∗This work was supported by DFG grant VO 889/2, EPSRC Grant GR/T07343/02, and by the EU
within the 6th Framework Programme under contract 001907 (DELIS).
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1.1 Recent work
Due to the apparent difficulty of computing Nash equilibria exactly [4, 5, 6], recent
work has addressed the question of polynomial-time computability of approximate Nash
equilibria, in particular the ǫ-Nash equilibria defined above. The effort has mostly
addressed 2-player games, and the general question is, for which values of ǫ can ǫ-Nash
equilibria be found in polynomial time? The payoffs ups in the games are restricted
to lie in the range [0, 1], since otherwise the payoffs (and associated values of ǫ) could
be rescaled arbitrarily. Recent papers include [2, 13], which show how to efficiently
compute 2-player ǫ-Nash equilibria for ǫ = 0.36392 and 0.3393 respectively. We do not
know of similar work so far that addresses the k-player case considered here.
The support of a probability distribution is the number of elements of its domain that
have non-zero probability. Solutions of games having small support (that is, players’
mixed strategies do not give positive probability to many of the pure strategies) are
attractive for two reasons. From the perspective of modelling a plausible outcome, we
expect a participant in a game to prefer a simple behaviour. Also, if constant-support
solutions exist, then if the number of players is constant, we can find them in polynomial
time by brute force. For example, this approach is used by Ba´ra´ny et al. [3] to find Nash
equilibria in random games. Our results show that additional players makes it genuinely
more intractable to find a satisfactory solution; if we restrict the support sizes to any
constant then the worst-case regret of some player increases.
It is known that for 2 players, if we restrict ourselves to solutions with constant
support, then there is a lower bound of 12 on the best ǫ that can be achieved [10],
and this lower bound is achieved by a very simple algorithm of Daskalakis, Mehta and
Papadimitriou [7].
Regarding the issue of how large the support size needs to be in order to allow an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium, it is shown by Altho¨fer [1] and Lipton et al. [12] that log(n)/ǫ2
support size is sufficient, and [12] point out that the general method works for any
constant number k of players. It follows that the brute-force “support enumeration”
algorithm takes time O(nlogn) for any ǫ > 0.
Very recently, He´mon et al. [11] studied independently from our work the problem
of computing approximate Nash equilibria in games with more than two players. The
results they obtain are very similar to the results presented in this paper. In particular,
they also show that for games with k players a (1− 1k )-Nash equilibrium with constant
support size can be computed efficiently and that this is the best possible which can be
achieved with constant support strategies. Additionally, they also show that support size
O(log(n)/ǫ2) is sufficient for computing ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria in the additive
and multiplicative sense.
1.2 Our Results
We give a simple algorithm, essentially an extension of [7] from the 2-player case to the
k-player case, that finds (1 − 1k )-Nash equilibria in which each player’s mixed strategy
has support size at most 2. Notice that this result becomes quite weak as k increases,
given that any set of mixed strategies constitutes a 1-Nash equilibrium (recall that we
assume all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]). However, we also show that one can do no
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better for constant support strategies. The argument is a kind of generalisation of the
one of [10] that gives the result for the 2-player case.
For unrestricted strategies, we give a method that uses any algorithm for the 2-
player case as a component, and provides slightly better values of ǫ than the above.
Finally, we show how the bounded differences inequality can be used to give a simplified
proof of a result of [12], that for a constant number of players, O(log n) support size is
sufficient for finding approximate equilibria. This allows us to deduce that if the number
of players is less than
√
n, there is a subexponential algorithm for finding approximate
Nash equilibria.
2 Details of Results
2.1 Solutions with Constant Support
In this section we generalise the results of [7, 10] from ǫ = 12 in the 2-player case, to
ǫ = 1− 1k in the k-player case.
Definition 1. Define a winner-takes-all game to be one in which, for any combination
of pure strategies, one player obtains a payoff of 1, and the other players obtain payoffs
of 0.
In the 2-player case, winner-takes-all games are win-lose games where the payoffs
sum to 1. Our generalisation of the lower bound of [10] follows their approach in that
we generate a random winner-takes-all game and show that for support sizes limited by
some constant t, for any ǫ < 1 − 1k , if the game is large enough, there will be positive
probability that any solution with supports at most t is not ǫ-Nash.
Definition 2. Define the total support of a mixed-strategy profile to be the sum over
all players p, of the number of strategies of p that p assigns non-zero probability.
Theorem 3. Let t and k be any positive integers, and let ǫ = 1− 1k . There exist games
having k players such that in any ǫ-Nash equilibrium, there must be at least one player
whose mixed strategy has support greater than t. (In particular, there exist games with n
strategies for each player such that in any ǫ-NE at least one player must have a strategy
with support Ω( k−1
√
log n).)
Proof. We construct a k-player winner-takes-all game G uniformly at random as follows.
Let each player have n pure strategies (a suitable value of n will be identified later). For
each combination of pure strategies, choose one of the k players uniformly at random
and let that player have an associated payoff of 1, while the remaining players have
payoffs of 0.
We prove that for large enough n, with positive probability, the resulting game has
the desired property.
Consider strategy profiles with total support t. There are less than
(kn
t
)
possible
support sets.
We choose n large enough such that for any individual support set of total size t,
the probability (with respect to random generation of G) that all players have regret
less than ǫ is less than 1/
(
kn
t
)
, so that we can apply a union bound.
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Given any mixed-strategy profile, we know that there exists at least one player who
has an expected payoff of at most 1/k, since the payoffs always sum to 1. Fix a support
set S of total size t. We show that all players (including in particular the one with
lowest expected payoff) have (with positive probability) a pure strategy that, if they
unilaterally defected to it, would give them payoff 1 (for any mixed profile using S).
For each player p, there are n pure strategies to choose from. In order for some given
strategy sp (available to player p) to have expected payoff of 1 with respect to the other
players’ strategies, a sufficient condition is that the payoff entries corresponding to sp
and the ≤ t − 1 strategies in use by the other players, should let player p win. There
are fewer than tk−1 pure-strategy combinations that the other players can select with
non-zero probability.
The probability that sp wins against a fixed pure-strategy combination is 1/k, so
the probability that sp wins against all pure-strategy combinations of the other players
is k−(t
k−1). Hence, the probability that player p has no strategy that guarantees him a
payoff of 1 is (
1− k−(tk−1)
)n
.
The probability that there exists a player p without a winning strategy is at most
k ·
(
1− k−(tk−1)
)n
.
The probability that there exists a support set for which there exists a player p
without a winning strategy is at most(
kn
t
)
· k ·
(
1− k−(tk−1)
)n
.
We can upper bound this probability by
k · (kn)t ·
(
1− k−(tk−1)
)n
.
Let us set t = k−1
√
a logk(n) for some constant a > 0. Then the term simplifies to
k · (kn) k−1
√
a logk(n) · (1− n−a)n . (1)
For a = 1/2, we can estimate (1− n−a)n by e−
√
n and hence (1) tends to zero when n
tends to infinity.
This ensures that if the size of the support set is bounded from above by k−1
√
logk(n)/2,
then, for large enough n, with positive probability each player has a pure strategy with
payoff 1, regardless of the choice of the support set.
Hence, we require a total support size of Ω( k−1
√
log n) to ensure an approximation
performance of better than 1− 1/k, which for two players agrees with the upper bound
of [12].
Corollary 4. If we restrict strategies to have constant support, there is a lower bound
of 1− 1k on the approximation quality that we can guarantee.
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Note that the above is a generalisation of a lower bound of [1, 10] from the 2-player
case to the k-player case. We show that this lower bound is optimal by giving an
algorithm (which is an extension of an algorithm of [7]) that finds a 1− 1k -approximate
Nash equilibrium where each player has support size at most 2.
Theorem 5. Let G be a k-player game with n strategies per player. Let ǫ = 1− 1k . There
is a mixed strategy profile in which each player has support at most 2 which constitutes
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The following algorithm achieves the stated objective.
1. Number the players 1, . . . , k. For i = 1, . . . , k − 1 in increasing order, player i
allocates a probability of 1− 1k+1−i to an arbitrary pure strategy si.
2. Player k allocates probability 1 to a pure best response bk to the strategy combi-
nation (s1, . . . , sk−1) of players 1, . . . , k − 1.
3. For i = k−1, . . . , 1 in decreasing order, player i allocates his remaining probability
1
k+1−i to a pure best response bi to the mixed strategy formed so far, i.e., to
the strategy (s1, . . . , si−1, ri+1, . . . , rk), where rj denotes the mixed strategy (1−
1
k+1−j ) · sj + ( 1k+1−j ) · bj.
In order to prove the theorem, we compute the regret of a player i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. To
avoid case distinctions, we denote by sk an arbitrary pure strategy of player k. If player
i plays strategy si, which happens with probability 1 − 1k+1−i , his regret can only be
bounded by 1. If player i plays strategy bi, then his regret is 0 if all players j < i play
strategy sj and his regret can be as bad as 1 otherwise. Altogether, this implies that
the regret of player i is bounded by
Pr [i plays si] +Pr [i plays bi] ·Pr [∃j < i : j plays bj]
=
(
1− 1
k + 1− i
)
+
1
k + 1− i

1− i−1∏
j=1
(
1− 1
k + 1− j
)
=1− 1
k
.
2.2 Solutions with non-constant support
The general issue of interest is the question of what approximation guarantee can we
obtain for a polynomial-time algorithm for k-player approximate Nash equilibrium. To
what extent can we improve on the above (weak) result when we allow unrestricted
mixed strategies? We do not have a very substantial improvement, but the following
shows how the trick of [7] can be combined with better 2-player algorithms to get an
improvement over the (1− 1k )-result that the above would yield for k players.
Theorem 6. If 2-player ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria can be found in polynomial time,
then k-player (k−2)−(k−3)ǫ(k−1)−(k−2)ǫ -Nash equilibria can be found in polynomial time.
As a corollary, the approximation guarantee of 0.3393 associated with the algorithm
of [13] gives a 3-player algorithm with an approximation guarantee of 0.6022.
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Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the number of players. Let δk =
(k−2)−(k−3)ǫ
(k−1)−(k−2)ǫ .
For k = 2, which is the induction basis, δ2 = ǫ. Now assume that there is an algorithm
Ak−1 with approximation guarantee δk−1 for (k − 1)-player games. The following algo-
rithm for k-player games achieves the stated approximation guarantee δk.
1. Player 1 allocates a probability of 1/(2− δk−1) to some arbitrary pure strategy s.
2. Players 2, . . . , k apply Ak−1 to the (k − 1)-player game that results from letting
player 1 play s.
3. Player 1 allocates his remaining probability to a pure best response b to the strate-
gies of players 2, . . . , k chosen in step 2.
A player i ∈ {2, . . . k} has regret at most δk−1 if player 1 plays strategy s and his
regret can be as bad as 1 otherwise. Hence, the regret of a player i ∈ {2, . . . k} can be
bounded by (
1
2− δk−1
)
· δk−1 +
(
1− 1
2− δk−1
)
=
1
2− δk−1 .
Player 1 has no regret when playing b and his regret can be as bad as 1 when playing s.
This implies that also the regret of player 1 can be bounded by 1/(2− δk−1). A simple
calculation shows
1
2− δk−1 =
1
2− (k−3)−(k−4)ǫ(k−2)−(k−3)ǫ
=
(k − 2)− (k − 3)ǫ
(k − 1)− (k − 2)ǫ = δk ,
as desired.
Finally, we use the bounded differences inequality to give a simplified proof of a
result of [12].
Theorem 7. Let G be a k-player game in which each player has n pure strategies.
Let ǫ > 0. Then there exists a mixed strategy profile where each player has support
k2 log(kn)/2ǫ2 that constitutes an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. In particular, the players’ distri-
butions are empirical distributions over multisets of size k2 log(kn)/2ǫ2.
Proof. The bounded differences inequality (see e.g. [9] p. 8) is the following. Let A be
a set. Let g : AN −→ R be a function with the bounded difference property: for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all x1, . . . , xN , x′i ∈ A
|g(x1, . . . , xN )− g(x1, . . . , xi−1, x′i, xi+1, . . . , xN )| ≤ ci.
Suppose X1, . . . ,XN are independent random variables over A. The bounded difference
inequality states that for all t > 0,
Pr [g(X1, . . . ,XN )−Eg(X1, . . . ,XN ) ≥ t]
≤ exp
(
−2t2∑N
i=1 c
2
i
)
,
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and
Pr [Eg(X1, . . . ,XN )− g(X1, . . . ,XN ) ≥ t]
≤ exp
(
−2t2∑N
i=1 c
2
i
)
.
We apply the above as follows. Let A = [n]k, the set of all pure profiles of k-person
games where each player has n strategies. The Xi are samples from some fixed Nash
equilibrium. Let gi,j be the payoff to player i for using strategy j subject to all players
using the mixture of N strategies obtained by taking, for each player p, the p-th entries
of each Xm (m ∈ [N ]), and using the uniform distribution on that multiset.
Note that for the gi,j functions, ci ≤ k/N .
We want the right-hand sides to be less than 1/2kn, so that by a union bound, for
each i and j, we have the payoff for player i using strategy j being close to expected.
Thus, we want N such that
exp(−2ǫ2/(N(k2/N2))) ≤ 1
2kn
.
Solving for N we get
N ≥ k
2 log(2kn)
2ǫ2
.
The theorem indicates that support enumeration is a subexponential algorithm pro-
vided that k = o(n1/2) (a brute-force search has complexity O(nkN ) which is subexpo-
nential for k = O(n1/2−ζ).) Let us remark, that for k = o(n1/3) support enumeration
is not only subexponential in the input size nk but also in the number n of different
strategies of the players. Hence, in this case, the running time is subexponential even
for more succinctly represented games.
3 Conclusions
It seems that only very weak approximation performance is possible with constant-
support strategies. Work on the special case of 2-player games has mostly addressed
this problem by constructing linear programs whose solutions have useful properties (and
are typically non-constant support strategies). For more than 2 players this approach no
longer works; the corresponding constraints are no longer linear. The challenge seems
to be to find alternative ways of describing mixed strategies (of more than constant
support) that have desirable properties.
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